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A NOTE ON DECLARATORY JUDGTM NT
PLEADING AND PRACTICE"
THOMAs B. JACKSON0 °
T HREE years ago as President of this Association, I delivered
an address advocating the adoption of declaratory judgment
procedure in the courts of this state by procedural rule to be pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals." Thereafter the
Judicial Council recommended such a rule to the court which, with-
out denying its jurisdiction, declined to make the procedure
effective on the ground that, if advisable, it should be effected
through legislative action rather than by rule of court. Later, your
Executive Council apparently impressed with the desirability of
the new procedure, secured the enactment of the Uniform Declar-
atory Judgment Act at the last session of the Legislature. At
the conclusion of my address one of the gentlemen who discussed
my paper, made a remark to the effect that there was some con-
fusion in his mind as to the necessary procedure to be followed in
obtaining a declaratory judgment. The thought on the part of
President Wyckoff, that such confusion, or at least unfamiliarity
as to pleading and practice, might exist among the members of the
bar, probably accounts for the invitation which he extended for
me to read a paper on the procedural aspects of the subject. With
equal thoughtfulness, he told me that I had been allotted thirty
minutes on the program. Accordingly I will attempt to discuss
briefly some of the more important matters which might be con-
sidered by a lawyer who seeks to obtain a declaratory judgment
under the West Virginia common law system of pleading.
NATURE or, ACTION.
At the outset, it seems desirable to refer to some of the essential
characteristics of a suit or action for a declaration, as a basis or
background for the practice and pleading thereunder. Spealdng
of such a proceeding, Borchard says:
* Address delivered at the fifty-seventh annual meeting of the West Virginia
Bar Association, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, on October 17,
1941.
** Former President of the West Virginia Bar Association; member of the
Charleston bar and of the Judicial Council of West Virginia.
1 Proposal for Declaratory Judgment Procedure (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 31,
(1938) W. VA. BAR Ass'N YEAmOOK 82.
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". ... that in form it differs in no essential respect from
any other action, except that the prayer for relief does not
seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing
party. It seeks only a final determination, adjudication,
ruling, or judgment from the court, but that the conditions of
the usual action, procedural and substantive, must always be
present, namely, the competence or jurisdiction of the court
over parties and subject-matter, the capacity of the parties to
sue and be sued, the adoption of the usual forms for conduct-
ing judicial proceedings (including process, pleadings, and evi-
dence), the existence of operative facts justifying the judicial
declaration of the legal consequences, the assertion against an
interested party of rights capable of judicial protection. and a
sufficient legal interest in the moving party to entitle him to
invoke a judgment in his behalf .... 2
Borchard says that "in principle declaratory relief is sui
generis and is as much legal as equitable." 3  The same authority
refers to the declaratory action as an autonomous institution but
admits its relationship to the usual forms of actions in saying:
"Yet it had to be fitted into the scheme of existing
remedies. While born under equitable auspices and having
preponderantly equitable affiliations, it proved nevertheless an
effective instrument available for the adjudication of legal
issues, provided the plaintiff were content with an adjudication
of his rights only and the court believed that it would ter-
minate the controversy. Yet it did not come into the com-
mon law side without protest, and to this day it is probably
less frequently employed on the law than on the equity side.
The procedure, now in most jurisdictions except New South
Wales, Florida and Rhode Island, available at both law and
in equity, has nevertheless in its flexibility and adaptability
imported many features from equity, for example, with re-
spect to joinder of parties to avoid a multiplicity of suits. In
these multiple suits, involving either a class or several parties
whose rights arise out of the same transaction, the declaration
has displayed some of its most useful functions." 4
Furthermore, it should be noted that, as pointed out by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,5 declaratory actions "...
are intended to supplement rather than to supersede ordinary
causes of action and to relieve litigants of the common law rule
that no declaration of rights may be judicially adjudged until a
2 BocuAit, DECLARATORY JuDGmENTS (1934) 23.
3 Id. at 138.
4 Id. at 1178.
5American National Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378,
174 S. E. 777 (1934).
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right has been violated. Preventive relief is the moving purpose.
Whether or not jurisdiction shall be taken is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Something more than 'an actual con-
troversy' is necessary. In common cases where a right has ma-
tured or a wrong has been suffered, customary processes of the
court, where they are ample and adequate, should be adopted."
Anderson, speaking of the classification of declaratory actions,
says:
"The only sound position that can be taken with respect to
such classification is that it partakes of the properties of both
legal actions and suits in equity, and that the court will apply
the rules with respect thereto as the nature of the case seems to
demand; that at times a declaratory judgment may properly
be classified as legal, carrying with it the attendant right to a
jury trial; and that at other times, it may correctly be desig-
nated as a suit in equity, warranting the issuance of an in-
junction, and authorizing the granting of extraordinary relief
generally." 6
Some of the courts have sustained Borchard's view and have
expressly held the declaratory action to be sui Juris, but exactly
what is meant by sui juris is not entirely clear from the decisions
or text writers. Presumably it means that in a declaratory action
the court is bound neither by strict legal nor equitable rules of pro-
cedure but that rather a combination of the principles embodied in
the two systems of pleading may be employed where necessary to
do justice and to accomplish the broad purposes of the act. This
idea is exemplified in the action of courts which have cast aside
the strict limitations imposed in the usual forms of action and
have made declarations according to the requirements of justice,
regardless of the prayer for relief, and has been expressed by
Borchard in his statement that the declaratory action "has the ad-
vantages of escaping the technicalities associated with equitable
and extraordinary remedies, thus enabling the substantive goal to
be reached in the speediest and most inexpensive form." Again,
the idea is exemplified in cases wherein "it has been held that
declaratory proceedings were special in nature and not an 'exercise
of general equity jurisdiction in which the court may grant con-
sequential relief under a general prayer or upon general equitable
conditions.' "
Whatever may theoretically be the precise nature of the
declaratory action- whether equitable, legal or sui generis- the
6 AhDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1940) 160.
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West Virginia lawyer who is about to seek a declaration will neces-
sarily proceed under the uniform act adopted in this state, which
will generally be referred to as the act or statute, and he will be
confronted with certain practical questions, an examination and
discussion of which may be of some value in determining what
pleading and practice is to be employed in obtaining the declara-
tion. The first question is whether the claim for declaratory relief
may be asserted at law or in equity, or in a suit or action partaking
of the nature of one or the other, or whether both such forms of
action may be ignored and the proceeding treated as being sui juris
in so far as the nature of the action is concerned. As heretofore
indicated, the sui juris theory seems to relate principally, if not
solely, to the relief granted, rather than to the form of action, and
consequently, for our purposes, no further consideration need be
given to it as respects the form tof action. In view of the present
adherence in this state to the forms of law and equity, and to the
distinction of one system from, the other, the first step in obtaining
a declaration is to determine on which side of the court- law or
equity- the proposed proceeding shall be brought. To deter-
mine the form of action, it would seem that the test is whether, if
coercive relief were sought, the claim under the facts involved, or
under comparable facts, would be asserted at law or in equity. This
determination involves only the process employed in deciding, in
a civil action under the federal procedure, whether the so-called
civil action under that procedure is in 'fact legal or equitable in
nature, and consequently in the ordinary case in a state court
there should not be much difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory
answer to the usually simple problem which is presented.
PRAECIPE.
Let us assume then that counsel has determined that a suit
in chancery is the proper vehicle for the pursuit of his remedy and
that he proceeds to prepare his praecipe. No difficulty is en-
countered, because a request to the clerk for issuance of a summons
in chancery to answer the bill of complaint suffices even though
the bill seeks only declaratory relief, but suppose counsel has con-
cluded that an action at law, or perhaps more properly speaking a
proceeding in the nature of an action at law, for a declaratory
judgment, is the proper vehicle. How then would the praecipe
read? Obviously the usual form of a request for a summons to
answer a plea of trespass on the case, or some other plea, with
4
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damages stated in a sum certain would scarcely be desirable. In
such instances, it is suggested that the praecipe should request
issuance of a summons to answer the plaintiff of a plea for a
declaratory judgment, or perhaps the request might be for a sum-
mons to answer the plaintiff in an action for a declaratory judgment
in view of the code provision that commencement of a suit may
be by a writ of summons against the defendant to answer "the
bill or action, '"7 from which it would seem that if the bill or
declaration sufficiently describes the cause of action and the re-
lief claimed, it should suffice. -While it is always desirable to
brino an action ion the proper side of the court, some comfort may
be had in the thought that if a mistake is made the case may not
be dismissed but may be transferred to the proper forum 8 But it
is better not to err at the start as a mistake is never satisfactory
and d change to another form of action is more or less irritating to
counsel and client and often can cause considerable delay, for which
reason proper consideration should be given to the form under
which declaratory relief is to be sought. Naturally the form of
summons follows the order contained in the praecipe and, after
issuance of summons and filing of the bill or declaration, further
proceedings in general follow the usual course of a suit in chancery
or action at law as to rules, demurrers, motions, pleas, evidence and
other matters. 9 This necessarily follows in view of the fact that
the statute, in contrast with the provisions of the federal declara-
tory judgments act,10 which empowers the federal courts to de-
clare rights, etc., "upon petition, declaration and complaint, or other
appropriate pleadings" is entirely silent on the subject of pleading.
At this point, however, it may be stated that mere matters of form
should not preclude relief where a justiciable controversy is proper-
ly presented in a case where the court has jurisdiction and the
necessary parties are before the court," even though the proceedings
may be erroneously entitled. 2
JURISDICTION.
Having determined the proper form of action, the next ques-
tion to decide is whether the court can and will exercise jurisdiction
7W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 3, § 4.
s Id. at c. 56, art. 4, § 11.
9 Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S. W. 56 (1925).
1o 28 U. S. C. A. § 400.
"1 Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed.
730 (1933).
12 Faulkner v. City of Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195 (1931).
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over the subject matter involved in a particular case. If the case
was one which was pending at the effective date of the act, then it
cannot be transformed into a proceeding for declaratory relief as
the statute is not retroactive and consequently not available for
amendment of the bill or declaration. 3
Section 1 of the act provides that "Courts of record within
their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed." Therefore our courts in general have juris-
diction for declaratory relief over.all subject matters over which
such jurisdiction is now exercised in other forms of actions but not
have any jurisdiction over subject matters not heretofore within
their jurisdiction. The broad jurisdiction mentioned is, however,
definitely limited by section 6 which states that "The court may
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where
such judgment or decree if rendered or entered, would not termi-
nate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
Under this section, the courts have exercised their discretion free-
ly and broadly with the result that in various classes of cases a
declaration has been refused, as (1) where it would serve no useful
purpose; (2) where special tribunals have been appointed to try
certain cases; (3) where the facts sought to be litigated were
hypothetical and presented a made case or were uncertain of
occurrence; (4) where the question raised was not real but theoret-
ical and the person raising it did not have a bona fide interest; and
(5) where there was no defender with a bona fide right to defend.1"
The application of the principles determining whether juris-
diction will be entertained or the declaration refused has resulted
in ,a great variety of decisions. Thus it has been held that the
legal rights of litigants must necessarily be involved as no court
sits for the purpose of settling questions of law which are merely
speculative or abstract. 5 For example, a court will not render a
declaration in a case where there is no difference between the parties
and both of them seek the same judgment, as in such case the pro-
ceeding is essentially one for an advisory opinion and nothing
niore,16 and in another case it was decided that a declaratory judg-
ment must be refused on the question of the right of voters to de-
termine whether cattle should be permitted to run at large in the
23 Watts v. Barker, 193 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1922).
14 Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
1. Stinson v. Graham, 286 S. W. 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
'a Burton v. Durham Realty & Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3 (1924).
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streets of incorporated municipalities, it appearing that no election
had been called and that no actual controversy was presented as
to the right to vote."2  And it should be borne in mind that a
declaration need not be made in cases where the plaintiff appre-
hends that a defendant may assert a claim, when in fact defendant
has made no claim,\even though the defendant has refused to waive
any rights.s Similarly, the courts have' frequently held that a
declaration as to future or contingent rights constitutes an advisory
opinion, as a valid declaratory judgment can only be rendered
after an event occurs and rights have become fixed under existing
states of fact. 9
There have been many decisions on jurisdictional questions
Where the constitutionality of a statute was involved. In Ohio
the constitutionality of a statute, providing that the district at-
torney should furnish to persons under indictment copies of all
papers to be used in the prosecution of the case, was challenged in
a declaratory action by the district attorney. A declaration was
refused on the ground that the power of the trial judge in the
criminal case, in admitting or rejecting proper evidence, when pre-
sented to him, could not be abridged in a declaratory action.2" In
New Jersey a declaratory action was sought for the purpose of
enjoining a criminal prosecution and having a statute, under which
such prosecution was to be made, declared unconstitutional. De-
claratory relief was refused because the chancery court had not
therefore had jurisdiction of any criminal matters."1 On the other
hand, in a New Hampshire case, subsequently affirmed without
opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States, the court held
that a person threatened with criminal prosecution for violation
of a statute had a clear right to test the validity of the statute by
a declaratory action." In another case, involving the constitu-
tionality of a statutory requirement that voters be able to read and
write the constitution in English to the satisfaction of an election
official, where a declaratory judgment was sought, relief was
granted although plaintiff would have had a remedy at law in case
17 Kelly v. Jackson, 206 Ky. 815, 268 S. W. 539 (1925).
is (1921) 12 A. L. R. 73.
19 State ex rel. LaFollette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 264 N. W. 627, 103 A.
L. R. 1089 (1936).
20 State ex rel. Reams v. McNary, 132 Ohio St. 262, 7 N. W. (2d) 230 (1937),
54 Ohio App. 496, 8 N. E. (2d) 153 (1936).
21 Moresh v. O'Regan, 122 N. J. Eq. 388, 192 At]. 831 (1937).
22Tirrell v. Johnston, 86 N. H. 530, 171 At]. 641 (1934), 293 U. S. 533, 55
S. Ct. 238, 79 L. Ed. 641 (1934).
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the official acted in bad faith or abused his discretion. -3 And it
has been held thav a plaintiff may have a declaration as to the con-
stitutionality of a statute even before the statute has taken effect
where it appears that such person will be directly damaged in his
person or property by enforcement of the statute, and that the
defendant is charged with the enforcement of the statute and is
about to proceed accordingly.2 4 In the last case referred to, plain-
tiff was engaged in the business of making small loans and it was
alleged that after the effective date of the statute the defendant,
who was director of licenses, would seek to enforce the statute
against plaintiff and that if such enforcement were made plaintiff
would suffer legal damages.
In another class of cases the courts have refused declaratory
judgments because they would be based upon the happening of a
contingent event and such a judgment would necessarily violate the
principle that there must be justiciable case or actual controversy.
Thus in a case, where a life beneficiary under a will at the time
had a life expectency of some twenty years, it was held that a
creditor of the beneficiary could not obtain a declaration that,
under the terms of the will, the debt should be paid at the death
of the beneficiary and before distribution of the trust estate to the
remainderman under the will.' In another case plaintiff was re-
fused a declaration as to his right to be subrogated to the rights
of a mortgagor upon payment by plaintiff of the mortgage when
it was the duty of other persons to pay same."' The rule for the
decisions in these two cases is the same as that applied in equity
under practice separate from that under declaratory judgment
statutes. Courts of equity often refuse to render judgments in
cases involving the happening or occurrence of a future event, be-
cause, until the event happens the court cannot know who may be
the necessary or proper parties . -7 But it has been held that a
person holding a contract of indemnity insurance, when a judg-
ment has been rendered against him, may seek a declaration against
his own insurance company which claims that it is not liable until
the insured shall have paid the judgment, and that the insurance
23 Allison v. Sharp, 209 N. 0. 477, 184 S. E. 27 (1936).
-4 Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. (2d) 341 (1937), 191
Wash. 706, 77 P. (2d) 595 (1938).
2 5 Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, 162 Tenn. 356, 36 S. IV. 905 (1931).
20 Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 242 N. W. 174 (1932).
27 (1921) 12 A. L. R. 69.
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was voided by breach of warranty, for the purpose of fixing liability
of the insurance company before the insured pays the judgment.2 8
In other cases it has been held that courts are limited to the
same subject matter generally dealt with in the usual forms of
action and there is nothing in the statute permitting a court to
extend its powers beyond the borders of the state and consequently
no judgment will be made or rendered in conflict or possible con-
flict with the sovereign power of another state," and that a court
may decline to make a declaration which affects the lights of per-
sons other than parties to the controversy."' In New Jersey where
law and equity are administered in separate courts, it has been
held, under the uniform act, that a court of equity has no power
to afford declaratory relief as to a purely legal right, 1 and it would
seem that in West Virginia the same principle would apply but
with the saving statute available in case of error on the part of
counsel in seeking relief in the wrong forum.
As to jurisdiction depending upon the amount involved,
declaratory relief may not be afforded in cases involving less than
the jurisdictional amount prescribed by the statute and similarly
no appeal lies in controversies involving less than the jurisdictional
amount. In one case the refusal to afford declaratory relief where
the ninimum jurisdictional amount was not involved, was based
upon the discretionary power of the coult,3 2 but it is submitted
that, at least in our state, the refusal of declaratory relief would
be mandatory.
VENUE.
It will be observed that the statute is silent as to the venue in
which a declaration may be sought. Here again, the rules prevailing
in the usual forms of action govern and the venue is the same as
it would be in such actions under the same or similar facts as the
general rules must apply in the absence of any provision with re-
spect thereto. It has been held, for example, that the act does not
affect statutory venue provisions and that an action for a declara-
tion should be brought in the county where defendant resides in-
stead of the county where the property, the subject matter of the
28 Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929).
29 Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. R., 246 N. Y. 194, 158
N. E. 70 (1927).
20 San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 278 Pac. 840 (1929), 209 Cal, 105, 287
Pac. 475 (1930).
31 Douglas v. United States P. & G. Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924).
.'2 A. Hamburger & Sons v. Kice, 129 Cal. App. 68, 18 P. (2d) 115 (1933).
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action, was located,"3 and that a. declaratory action to determine the
right of parties to convey good title, need not be instituted in the
county in which premises are located but may be instituted in any
county where the defendants could properly be reached by service
of process. 3
4
PARTIS.
General Principles.
As to what parties are necessary to a declaratory judgment
proceeding, as might be expected, the general rules of equity
apply. The subject is covered by section 11 of the act which pro-
vides that all persons having any claim or interest which would
be affected by the declaration, shall be made parties and that no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding. A municipality must be made a party in cases in-
volving the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise and is
entitled to be heard, and the attorney general of the state must be
served "with a copy of the proceeding" where the statute, ordi-
nance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional and likewise is
entitled to be heard. The language of the section providing that
the Attorney General be served "with a copy of the proceeding"
is not altogether clear as the term "proceeding" in its most com-
prehensive sense includes every step taken in a civil action, except
the pleadings, and it has been held in West Virginia that the term
includes any step or measure taken in the prosecution or defense
of an action, except an order of continuance.3 5 In all probability,
however, in spite of the technical meaning of the word, it would
seem to be intended that service of a copy of the bill or declaration
is sufficient while the provision that the Attorney General shall be
entitled to be heard, would seem broad enough to give him the
right to intervene.
In general the decisions apply the rules referred to and em-
bodied in section 11. In one of the leading cases on declaratory
judgments, the Supreme Court of the United States, in holding
that it had the power under the Federal Constitution to review a
declaratory, judgment of a state court, based its decision upon the
fact that in addition to the element of a case or controversy being
present, the requirement, that all persons interested be before the
'1 Edwards v. Bernstein, 231 Ky. 100, 21 S. W. (2d) 133 (1929).
34 Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d) 481 (1930).
35 Strom v. Montana Cent. Ry., 81 Minn. 346, 84 N. W. 46 (1900) ; Millar v.
Whittington, 87 W. Va. 664, 105 S. E. 907 (1921).
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court, had been met."- In a Kansas case, involving the validity of
a tax deed there was also raised the question of the validity of
quit-claim deeds, which were mere securities for debts owing to a
person who was a party to the action and to another person who
was not a party, the court refused to make any declaration on such
quit-claim deeds as to the person not a party to the suit.3 ' The
courts have even gone further than to refuse a declaration against
persons not parties to the litigation and have held that it was the
duty of the court to make such persons parties and to bring them
before the court or to dismiss the action without prejudice.38 In a
proceeding to test the validity of an ordinance fixing the basis for
a tax assessment, it was held that all taxpayers within the territory
affected were necessary parties, 3 and in an insurance case, in-
volving the right to disability benefits as between a corporation
and the committee of one of its officers, where the insurance com-
pany did not contest the disability and was ready to make payment
to the proper party, it was nevertheless held that the insurance
company was a necessary party." In another case, where motor
fuel dealers contended that a tax statute was unconstitutional, it
was held that the application for a declaration should be dismissed
because it failed to join, as necessary parties, consumers who had
paid the tax on motor fuel.41 Where a judgment was sought, de-
claring a change in a zoning ordinance to be invalid, it was held
that all property owners in the area affected must be joined as
parties, directly or through representation,4 and in another zoning
case a declaration was refused because "a copy of the proceeding"
had not been served on the attorney general of the state.4 3 Where
plaintiff's property had been taken by a county under a condemna-
tion proceeding and plaintiff sought a declaration against the
validity of a city ordinance, the invalidity of which would have
increased the value of plaintiff's property and entitled plaintiff
to a larger award in the condemnation proceeding, it was held that
the county was a necessary party defendant to the action. 4
36 Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L.
Ed. 730 (1933).
37 Colver v. Miller, 127 Kan. 72, 272 Pac. 106 (1928).
38 Savin v. Delaney, 229 Ky. 226, 16 S. E. (2d) 1039 (1929).
39 Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 274 Pac. 743 (1929).
40 Ez parte Hirsch's Committee, 245 Ky. 132, 53 S. W. (2d) 211 (1932).
41 Arlington Oil Co. v. Hall, 130 Neb. 674, 266 N. W. 583 (1936).
42 National Transportation Co. v. Toquet, 123 Conn. 468, 196 AtI. 344 (1937).
43 Johnston v. Board of Adjustment, 15 N. J. Misc. 283, 190 At. 782 (1937).
44 MacEwen v. New Rochelle, 149 Misc. 251, 267 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1933).
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PLAINTIFS.
The most striking difference between plaintiffs in the declara-
tory action and in the usual form of action is that a person who
would ordinarily or necessarily be a defendant in the latter, may
be a plaintiff in the former. This is permissible under section 1
of the act which states that "The declaration may be either af-
firmative or negative in form and effect", from which it follows
that any party to a justiciable controversy may be a plaintiff, if
he denies the existence of a right, status or legal relationship of
another. Thus, an insurance company may sue to determine
whether or not its liability policy covers the liability of the assured
arising out of an accident, 4 and a lessor is entitled to a declaration
as to his lessee's right to renew a lease.4 Each'of these cases illus-
trates the reversal in the nominal positions of the parties as con-
trasted with the usual form of action. It may be further observed
that under section 2 of the act, and also under section 4 where the
plaintiff is interested through a fiduciary, the plaintiff must have
a substantial interest in the subject matter with respect to which
the declaration is sought. Thus a widow and children of a de-
ceased testator are entitled to a declaration as to the right of the
widow to sell real estate devised to her, during widowhood, if neces-
sary for the support of herself and children.4 7  But a city is not
entitled to a judgment as against persons alleged to have deposited
materials in a lake and to have erected structures on the bed of
the lake, where title to the bed of the lake is vested in the state."
This principle is of general application, notably in litigation in-
volving attacks upon the validity of tax laws and constitutionality
of other legislation. Where a statute provided for review of
municipal tax levies by a board of tax commissioners, taxpayers
were held to have a sufficient interest to entitle them to a declara-
tion as to the constitutionality of such statute.49  In general, any
person having property rights which will be affected by the enforce-
ment of a penal statute may seek a declaration as to the validity
or the construction of such statute." There are, however, a num-
ber of cases in which a declaration has been refused because of
lack of interest on the part of the parties in the would-be subject
45 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenough, 88 N. H. 391, 190 Ati. 129 (1937).
43 Pulsifer v. Walker, 85 N. H. 434, 159 Atl. 426 (1932).
47 Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924).
48 City of Madison v. Schott, 211 Wis. 23, 247 N. W. 527 (1933).
49 Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186 (1930).
'0 Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927).
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matter of the declaration. This principle is based on the fact that
there must be a justiciable controversy or, as some of the statutes
and cases express it, an actual controversy.
DEFENDANTS.
The question as to what persons must be made defendants is
governed by section 11 and in the ordinary case presents no dif-
ficulties. It is not necessary always to join all possible parties
and it has been held that joinder of all parties having 'an interest
in questions of fact or law is not necessary where merely a per-
sonal judgment is sought and the parties in court are not prej-
udiced :by the fact that other parties are not brought in,5' nor
do the requirements of section 11 preclude the exercise of the
discretion of a court as to who are necessary parties. 52  The rule
is not mandatory in every case and the court may exercise discre-
tion, particularly in view of the provision that the declaration does
not prejudice rights of persons not parties. The necessity for par-
ties having adverse interests is illustrated by the requirement that
such parties must be so interested in a relationship between them
that a judgment will constitute res judicata as between them.i''
It is not sufficient that every person on one side, though interested,
disagree as to the applicable law. 4
JOINDER OF CAUSES AND PARTMES.
A consideration of the matter of parties leads to questions
involved in joinder of parties and causes. The closest approach to
a solution of such questions is contained in section 11 of the act.
Where the action for declaratory relief is legal in nature, it is
necessary that there be a joint obligation or liability on the part of
the defendants and, if in equity, that there be a community of in-
terest in questions of law and fact arising in the action, but the
principle of joinder cannot be stretched to cover cases where it
is sought to have the court determine which one of several de-
fendants is liable, where it is claimed or admitted that recovery can
be had against only one of them.
It has been held that where there is a joinder of two defend-
ants whose claims are separate and independent, either claim be-
ing capable of being determined without the other'before the court.
zu Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206 (1931).
52 Powers v. Vinsant, 165 Tenn. 390, 54 S. W. (2d) 938 (1932).
53 (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1243.
.4 Ibid.
13
Jackson: A Note on Declaratory Judgment Pleading and Practice
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
a demurrer on the ground of multifariousness must be sustained,
the court remarking that proceedings under the declaratory judg-
ment act are governed by the established rules of pleading25  In
one case, between a single plaintiff and more than three hundred
named defendants, it was held that the action was maintainable
as one in equity, upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of
suits, the court in this instance remarking that although the declara-
tory judgment law was not clear upon joinder of parties, a liberal
construction should be adopted or, if such liberal construction was
not justifiable, then the action should be maintained upon the equi-
table principle of permitting a joinder in case of a community of
interest in fact or law, to avoid a multiplicity of suits. In raising
the question of liberal construction the court apparently overlooked
section 15 declaring the act "to be remedial", its purpose "to set-
tle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with re-
spect to rights, status and other legal relations" and stating that
it is "to be liberally construed and administered." In another
case, a town brought suit on behalf of property owners, to enjoin
a highway contractor, from doing certain work, and joined as
defendants a surety on his bond, a subcontractor, and water com-
missioners incurring certain expenses in changing water services.
It was held that the proceeding was not only desirable as a means
of ,preventing a multiplicity of suits to determine the rights of
each of the defendants, but that the action would lie to determine
the respective liabilities of the plaintiffs among themselves and
also the liability of the defendants to the plaintiffs and to one
another.17  The last mentioned case is a good illustration of the
liberality of construction and administration called for by section
13. Also, it has been held that persons, who are not parties to an
action for a declaratory judgment or privies to the parties to the
action and consequently not bound thereby under section 11 of the
act, cannot assert the conclusiveness of the judgment between the
parties thereto where such persons seek to establish a claim against
one of such parties-8
BILL Or DECLARATION.
The act permits a form of judgment not heretofore available
from which it follows that the bill or declaration need not contain
averments or allegations necessary to support one of the usual
N5 ewsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S. W, 56 (1925).
56 Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206 (1931).
5 Town Board of Greece v. Murray, 130 Misc. 55, 223 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1927).
-8 DeCharette v. St. Mathews B. & T. Co., 214 Ky. 400, 283 S. W. 410 (1926).
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forms of action under the same or similar facts, it being sufficient
if the "ripening seeds" of a controversy may be adjudicated, pro-
vided proper claims of the parties exist and threaten litigation in
the immediate future which seems unavoidable, 9 nor need plaintiff
allege that relief might be obtained "in some other form of action
at the time a declaration is sought, because, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, it is not necessary to show a violation or invasion of rights or
that plaintiff has acquired a claim against defendant prior to insti-
tution of the declaratory suit.0
CROSS-BILL.
Defendant's answer or plea seems to require no special com-
ment other than that, in accordance with the principle stated that
the usual rules of pleading apply, there would seem to be nothing
in the act to prevent a defendant from setting up his side of the
controversy, in a proper case, as a counter-claim, or in proper
cases, to allow other parties to intervene. 1 In a case where a school
district sued one claiming to be an employee, for a declaration that
no contract of employment existed, and the defendant counter-
claimed, asserting his rights under the alleged contract, the de-
fendant was entitled to a trial of the issues under his counter-
claim and a judgment against him constituted a complete adjudica-
tion of the controversy between the parties.6
AmENDMENT.
As heretofore several times pointed out, the usual rules of
pleadings apply in declaratory actions, and this is true as to
amendments, as well as in other instances. In accordance with such
rules, whenever a declaration may be dismissed on demurrer, leave
to amend should be afforded.63 It seems strange that such a com-
paratively simple rule should have been questioned as often as it
has been. Because of the fact that a court may not enter a declara-
tory judgment where the necessary facts are not disclosed, 4 a
court has full power to require additional pleading or proof where
necessary for proper adjudication of the matters involved in the
59 Be Cryan, 301 Pa. 386, 152 Atl. 675 (1930).
60 Carolina Power & Light, Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933).
61 Jefferson County ex rel. Coleman v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 33 S. W. (2d) 601
(1930); Cloverdale Union High School Dist. v. Peters, 88 Cal. App. 731, 264
Pac. 273 (1928).
62 Ibid.
63 Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923).
6c4 Snowden v. Masonic Life Ass'n, 244 Ky. 286, 50 S. W. (2d) 569 (1932).
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action. " , in a suit to enjoin a criminal prosecution for failure to
pay a license fee, where it was held that an injunction would not
lie, plaintiff was permitted to transform his suit by amendment
into one for declaratory relief against the constitutionality of
the statute requiring the license fee and prescribing a penalty for
failure to pay the same."
EvIDNCE.
Naturally, the act is silent on the question of evidence as to
which the ordinary rules with regard thereto apply. The only
noteworthy feature in considering evidence where declaratory re-
lief is sought is the rule that the so-called burden of proof does not
shift because of the reversal of the position of the parties from
what such position would be in the usual form of action. Thus in
an action by an insurance company against an insured to determine
the coverage afforded by an automobile insurance policy, it was
held that the burden of proof, which would rest upon the plaintiff
in an action against the insurer, is not upon the insurer in a suit
by the latter for a determination of the coverage, there being no
strict and rigid rule that the primary burden of proof is upon the
party bringing the suit, as the rule with regard to burden of proof is
not based upon initiative action, but rather on expediency and in-
herent justice.6 7  There is nothing in the act to indicate any in-
tent to shift the burden of proof upon a party merely because he
avails himself of the act, and it cannot be said that his right to
have a disputed claim adjudicated imposes any duty upon him to
prove the claim unfounded.
Issus Op FACT.
Although section 9 of the act provides for a jury trial in de-
termining issues of fact, in the same manner that such issues "are
tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which
the proceeding is pending", no mention is made as to the form
of verdict. The federal act 8 provides for interrogatories, whether
a general verdict be required or not, and it would seem that the
same procedure may be followed' under the West Virginia statute,"
providing for one or more interrogatories to the jury.
of, Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees v. Dupriest, 235oKy. 46, 29 S. W.
(2d) 599 (1930); Mason's Adm'r v. Mason's Guardian, 239 Ky. 208, 39 S.
W. (2d) 211 (1931).
00 Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 Atl. 193 (1934).
67 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenough, 88 N. H. 391, 190 Atl. 129 (1937).
68 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (3).
69 W. VA. CoD (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 6, § 5.
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FoRM Op RELIEF G RNTm.
Obviously the form of relief which may be granted is derived
from and limited by section 1 of the act,7 0 although not limited
to the issues joined," and the decisions of the courts recognize such
fact. It has been held though that equitable terms may not be
imposed on the parties as a condition to the relief sought.' Wherc
a declaration is sought under the provisions of section 2 permitting
the interpretation and construction of a written instrument, the
declaration is limited to rights involved in the question of con-
struction in so far as the same affects the rights of persons inter-
ested." However, it should be noted that a court of equity may
not declare a purely legal right.7 4 As to the extent of the effect
of the declaration, the same limitations apply as in the case of the
usual forms of action, and, therefore, no declaration can be made
which has the further effect of a declaration as to the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding.75
JUDGMENTS GENERALLY.
The distinguishing feature of the judgment is that it is only
a declaration and that it "may be either affirmative or negative in
form, and effect." The precise nature of the language used with
respect to form and effect is in contrast with the English rule,'
which is not so specific although a right to a negative declaration
under the English practice is now generally recognized. In a
leading English case one of the justices predicted that a negative
declaration was one that would hardly ever be made, as the person
who might assert it would'be left to set up his defense in an action
when brought against him, and proceeded to say that the fact of a
negative declaration being asked for a purpose which the court did
not approve, would not take away the power of the court to make
it but only give reason to refuse it."7 The holding in the English
case referred to is certainly in contrast to the modern trend of de-
cisions.
70 Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 199, 242 N. W. 570 (1932).
71 Stueek v. G. C. Murphy Po., 107 Conn. 656, 142 AMi. 301 (1928).
7! Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 At]. 274 (1928).
73 Naugle v. Baumann, 96 N. J. Eq. 183, 125 Atl. 489 (1924).
74 Paterson v. Currier, 98 N. J. Eq. 48, 129 Atl. 711 (1925).
75 Citv of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 278 Pac. 840 (Cal. 1929).
Tr Order XXV r. 5: "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection,
on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby,
and the court may make binding declarations of right whether any conse-
quential relief is or could be claimed or not."
,7 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay &, Co., (1915) 2 K. B. 536.
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COSTS.
Section 10 of the act provides for such award of costs "as
may seem equitable and just," and the general principles govern-
ing the award of costs would seem to apply. It has been held
that costs should be imposed upon a plaintiff who has prema-
turely instituted his suit,78 and where the plaintiff did not have
the legal right to institute the proceeding, and defendant inter-
posed a counter-claim, it was held that costs should not be im-
posed upon the defendant.7 9  In another case it seems that the
equities required that no costs be adjudged against the defendant
and that all costs be paid by complainants, where the validity of
a statute was involved."0 Costs upon appeal have been denied to
plaintiff because of the public character of the question involved
in a case involving a license tax on sales at retail in which a state
treasurer was defendant.8 1
REVIEW.
Under section 7 of the act, all orders, judgments and decrees
"may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees." This
section speaks for itself and needs little comment, it being plain
that an appeal will lie though the final judgment does not require
plaintiff to pay any money or to do any act,8' and that on appeal a
judgment will be affirmed where nothing in it is prejudicial to the
rights claimed by the appellant." '
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS DECLARED.
In cases where one of the parties disregards the declaratiodi
which has been rendered against him, the provisions of section .
become extremely important. The section reads as follows:
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or
decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The
application therefor shall be by petition to a court having
jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed
sufficient, the court, shall, on reasonable notice, require any
adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the
declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further
relief should not be granted forthwith."
78 Lynn v. Lyman, 293 Pa. 490, 143 Atl. 200 (1928).
79 Appeal of Kimmell, 96 Pa. Super. 488 (1929).
so Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927).
81 Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, 260 N. W. 165 (1935).
82 Orton v. Daigler, 120 Cal. App. 448, 8 P. (2d) 161 (1932).
83 Mendel v. Congregation Adath Israel, 213 Ky. 371, 281 S. W. 163 (1926).
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It is plain from the second sentence that consequential relief
need not necessarily be sought in the court which granted the
declaratory relief but such fact does not dispose of the question
of how such further relief may be obtained, and on this question
there is a marked disagreement between the various courts. Al-
though courts generally have inherent power to enforce their own
judgments and such power does not seem to be limited by section
8, yet it has been held in one of the leading cases that the provision,
that further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted
whenever necessary, refers to additional declaratory relief and
does not provide a new remedy by which an executory judgment
may be had on a matter which was previously the subject of a
declaratory judgment,-4 under which decision it appears that the
proper method for coercive relief is the institution of a new action
on the same facts but disregarding the declaratory judgment. On
the other hand, it has been held that supplemental relief, based on
section 8, is not limited to further declaratory relief but may in-
clude any relief essential to effectuate the declaratory judgment,
and that after granting declaratory relief a court may reserve the
right to make such further orders as may be necessary to effectuate
the declaratory judgment, even though no petition has been filed
for further relief.8 5 It is submitted that the cases affording further
relief in the declaratory action, or in an action based upon a de-
claratory judgment, are in accord with the theory and purpose of
the act and effectuate the provision of the act requiring liberal
construction and administration thereof.
In conclusion, let me say that I trust that what is contained
in this paper will serve to remove at least some of the confusion
relating to, or unfamiliarity with, pleading and practice in declara-
tory actions, referred to in the beginning, and that it will in some
measure convince my listeners that such pleading and practice is
as simple, if not simpler, than that prevailing in many of our usual
forms of action.
84 Brindley v. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N. E. 301 (1935).
85 Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N. W. 921 (1936).
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